I mainly work in metaphysics and the philosophy of science with a focus on two main areas. First, I study the metaphysical underpinnings of scientific explanations, in particular how explanatory notions, such as causation, laws of nature, and counterfactual dependence, fit into the world as described by our best physics.
Second, I use scientifically-informed notions of these phenomena to examine how they bear on issues of genuine human concern, such as free will, personal identity, and rational decision-making. Recently, I have also worked on the metaphysics of causation more generally, as well as on questions about (im)mortality.
“Causation, Physics, and Fit” (2017) Synthese 194 (6): 1945–1965.
“Boltzmannian Immortality” (2017) Erkenntnis 82 (4): 761–776.
“The Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence” (2017) Philosophy of Science 84 (3): 436–455.
“Die Richtung der Zeit” (2017) Handbuch der Metaphysik, Stuttgart: Metzler, 256–261.
“Causes as Difference-Makers for Processes” (2017) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12424.
“Fundamentality and Time’s Arrow” (2018) Philosophy of Science 85: 483–500.
“Freier Wille und Naturgesetze: Überlegungen zum Konsequenzargument” (2019) in: Stosch et al.(eds.), Streit um die Freiheit. Paderborn: Schöningh (with Andreas Hüttemann).
“What Humeans Should Say about Tied Best Systems” (2020) Analysis 80: 273–282, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz047 (with Siegfried Jaag).
“Humean Laws and (nested) Counterfactuals” (2020) Philosophical Quarterly 70: 93–113, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz037 (with Siegfried Jaag).
“Why Defend Humean Supervenience?” (2020) Journal of Philosophy 117: 387–406 (with Siegfried Jaag).